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Abstract
Many philosophers and scientists believe that we need an explanation as to why the 
laws of physics and the initial conditions of the universe are fine-tuned for life. The 
standard two options are: theism and the multiverse hypothesis. Both of these theo-
ries are extravagant and arguably have false predictions. Drawing on contemporary 
philosophy of mind, I outline a form of panpsychism that I believe offers a more par-
simonious and less problematic explanation of cosmological fine-tuning.
Keywords Fine-tuning · Multiverse · Panpsychism · Russellian monism · Theism · 
Problem of evil · Design arguments
Once ridiculed, panpsychism is increasingly being taken seriously in contempo-
rary analytic philosophy of mind. Many hope that it can provide an attractive mid-
dle way between physicalism and dualism, avoiding the deep difficulties associated 
with each. In this paper, I will explore another potential application of panpsychism: 
explaining cosmic fine-tuning. There are a number of parameters in the basic laws 
of physics and initial conditions of the universe that are such that, for life to be pos-
sible, the values of those parameters needed to fall in an exceedingly narrow range. 
Many scientists and philosophers think there must be an explanation of why, of all 
the values they might have had, these parameters have precisely the values needed 
in order for life to be possible. There are deep difficulties with both of the standard 
explanations of this ‘fine-tuning’ of the laws of nature: theism and the multiverse 
hypothesis. I will argue that if one adopts a certain form of panpsychism, one can 
explain the fine-tuning in terms of the mental capacities of the universe, and that 
this constitutes a significantly less problematic and significantly more parsimonious 
explanation of the fine-tuning.
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I – Russellian panpsychism
Russellian monism
To understand recent sympathies for panpsychism, we must begin with the view that 
has become known as ‘Russellian monism’, so-called because it is inspired by cer-
tain theses defended by Russell in The Analysis of Matter (Russell 1927).
For most of the twentieth century philosophers adopted a ‘brain-first’ approach 
to consciousness. The idea was that the brain is the thing we really understand, 
through neuroscience, and the task of the philosopher is to try to understand how 
that thing ‘gives rise’ to subjective experience: to the inner world of colours, smells 
and sounds that each of us knows in her or his own case. Russellian monists turn this 
on its head, arguing that physical science tells us surprisingly little about nature of 
the brain—and of matter more generally—and that it is the nature of consciousness 
that we really understand: through being conscious. The philosophical task, then, 
is to build our picture of the brain around our understanding of consciousness. In 
opposition to the brain-first approach, Russellian monists adopt a ‘consciousness-
first’ approach to the mind–body problem.
In what sense does physical science tell us little about the nature of matter? In the 
public mind physics is on its way to giving us a complete account of the fundamen-
tal nature of space, time and matter. Upon reflection, however, it becomes apparent 
that physical science is exclusively concerned with what matter does. Neuroscience 
characterises brain states in terms of their causal role in the overall functional econ-
omy of the brain, and in terms of their chemical constituents. Chemistry character-
ises those chemical constituents in terms of their causal relationships and in terms 
of their physical constituents. And physics characterises basic physical properties 
entirely dispositionally. Mass, for example, is characterised in terms of the disposi-
tions to attract and to resist acceleration. The physical sciences provide us with rich 
information about how physical entities behave but tell us nothing about their intrin-
sic nature.
One response to this fact is to deny that matter has an intrinsic nature, in so far 
as this is defined as something which would go beyond its causal properties. Let us 
say that a physical object—such as an electron or the cerebellum—has an ‘intrinsic 
nature’ just in case it instantiates categorical properties, where a ‘categorical prop-
erty’ is defined as a property with a more-than-merely-dispositional nature, that is 
to say a nature that cannot be completely captured in causal terms.1 A categorical 
property may involve, or realise, causal powers, but there is more to its nature than 
its causal features.
Why believe in intrinsic natures and categorical properties? If physics just tells 
us what matter does, then maybe that’s all there is to matter. Maybe once you 
know what an electron does, you know everything there is to know about what an 
electron is. On this view—known in the philosophical literature as ‘dispositional 
1 Note that, by my definitions, ‘intrinsic nature’ is not synonymous with ‘intrinsic property’.
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essentialism’—physical entities are not so much beings as doings (Bird 2007; 
Ellis 2001, 2002; Molnar 2003; Mumford 2004). If dispositional essentialism is 
intelligible, then the postulation of categorical properties seems to be surplus to 
requirements.
Russellian monists have argued that the universe described by dispositional 
essentialists is not intelligible, as its characterisation of physical properties inevi-
tably ends up involving either vicious regress or vicious circularity; this is known 
as ‘the regress argument’ (Campbell 1976; Robinson 1982; Blackburn 1990; Arm-
strong 1997; Heil 2003; Lowe 2006; Goff 2017: Ch. 6). A disposition is defined in 
terms of its manifestation: the property which comes to be instantiated when the 
disposition is manifested. The manifestation of fragility, for example, is breaking. 
You can’t understand the nature of a disposition until you know what its manifesta-
tion is; you don’t know what fragility is, for example, until you know what it is for 
something to break. But according to dispositional essentialism, all properties are 
dispositions, and hence the manifestation of any given disposition A will itself be 
another disposition B, and the manifestation of B will be another disposition C, and 
so on ad infinitum. The nature of A cannot be understood until one understands B 
(as one cannot understand the nature of a disposition until one knows the nature of 
its manifestation), and one cannot understand the nature of B until one understands 
the nature of C, and so on for ever. It is thus impossible for anyone to understand the 
nature of any of the properties instantiated in a dispositional essentialist universe. In 
other words, a dispositional essentialist universe is unintelligible.
If the regress argument is sound then there must be categorical properties under-
lying the dispositions ascribed by physical science. But even if it is not, it is surely 
coherent to suppose that physical properties involve categorical properties.2 The 
core of the Russellian monist proposal is simply that: (i) physical properties involve 
categorical properties, and (ii) consciousness is explained in terms of those categori-
cal properties.3
The attraction of Russellian monism is that it promises to avoid both the problems 
facing dualism and the problems facing standard physicalism. The dualist claims 
that consciousness is a fundamental property distinct from the physical properties of 
the brain. But interactionist dualism is arguably incompatible with physical causal 
closure, the thesis that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause; and 
physical causal closure is something many take to have strong empirical support.4 
2 Some Russellian monists identify physical properties with categorical properties; on this view, mass is 
a categorical property picked out in physics in terms of causal role. Others hold that physical properties 
are dispositions that are grounded in categorical properties. I will use the world ‘involve’ to cover both of 
these options.
3 In Goff (2017), I give a more detailed definition of Russellian monism to distinguish it from forms of 
physicalism which are also committed to categorical properties.
4 Probably the best defence of this is Papineau (2001). I discuss the issue in some detail in Goff (2017): 
Ch 9.
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If the physical events involved in my writing this essay can be entirely explained in 
terms of physical events in my brain, then this would seem to ‘crowd out’ the possi-
bility of my conscious thoughts having any role to play (assuming that the dualist is 
correct that my conscious thoughts are distinct from my physical brain processes).5 
The physicalist avoids this problem by identifying conscious states with physical or 
functional states of the brain.6 The problem is that there are powerful arguments—
the knowledge argument and the conceivability argument—which seem to show that 
conscious states cannot possibly be identical with physical or functional states of the 
brain (Jackson 1982; Chalmers 2009; Goff 2017).
The Russellian monist avoids the problems facing dualism by identifying con-
scious states with categorical-property-involving states of the brain. In a sense, they 
accept physical causal closure, if the ‘sufficient physical causes’ in terms of which 
any given physical event can be explained can include categorical properties. The 
Russellian monist accepts that my typing of this essay can be entirely explained in 
terms of categorical-property-involving states of my brain, but this does not exclude 
my conscious thoughts playing a role, as (according to Russellian monism) my con-
scious thoughts exist among those categorical-property-involving states of my brain 
(Chalmers 2015; Goff 2017).7
Why is the Russellian monist identity between conscious states and physical 
states not ruled out by the knowledge and conceivability arguments? These argu-
ments rule out the identification of conscious states with causal-structural proper-
ties revealed by physical science, but they do not have any bearing on the identifica-
tion of conscious states with certain of the categorical properties that (according to 
Russellian monism) underlie those causal-structural properties. To take the conceiv-
ability argument, it is plausible that we can conceive of a creature that duplicates a 
human in terms of all of its causal-structural features but which nonetheless lacks 
consciousness; it is much less clear that we can conceive of a creature that dupli-
cates a human being in terms of its categorical properties but which nonetheless 
lacks consciousness (Stoljar 2001; Chalmers 2015; Goff 2017).
Varieties of Russellian monism
Panpsychist versus neutral forms of Russellian monism
Russellian monists are united in believing that basic physical properties involve cat-
egorical properties and that those categorical properties are involved in the ground-
ing of consciousness. But they disagree concerning the positive nature of the basic 
7 Howell (2015) argues that Russellian monism cannot avoid causal exclusion worries.
5 I am assuming in this example that thoughts are a kind of conscious state. This is somewhat conten-
tious, but a different example, using a less contentious example such as pain, could easily be given.
6 It is generally held that over-determination (there being two distinct sufficient causes for a single effect) 
is innocuous in cases in which one of the two causes is constituted by the other (Bennett 2003; Goff 
2017: Ch. 6). Hence, given that functional states are constituted of physical states, the identification of 
conscious states with functional states does not lead to worrying over-determination.
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categorical features of the physical world. Panpsychist Russellian monists take the 
categorical properties involved in basic physical properties to themselves be con-
sciousness-involving. Thus, the consciousness-involving properties of the macro-
level human brain are grounded in consciousness-involving properties at a more 
basic level (Strawson 2006; Goff 2017). Neutral Russellian monists, in contrast, 
deny that the categorical properties involved in basic physical properties are con-
sciousness-involving. Some neutral Russellian monists offer a positive alternative 
account of their categorical nature, others accept that (at least at present) we have no 
clear idea of what their categorical nature amounts to.8
I have previously argued that once one accepts Russellian monism, there is a 
clear simplicity argument for panpsychist over neutral versions (Goff 2017). From 
the starting point that (i) physical science tells us nothing about the intrinsic nature 
of matter, and (ii) some material entities, i.e. brains, have a consciousness-involving 
intrinsic nature, the most simple and elegant supposition is that the intrinsic nature 
of entities outside of (and of the proper parts of) brains is continuous with that of 
brains in also being consciousness-involving. However, for the purposes of this 
paper, it is sufficient that panpsychist forms of Russellian monism are no less parsi-
monious or otherwise problematic than neutral versions. Assuming Russellian mon-
ism, basic matter must have some intrinsic nature that goes beyond the causal-struc-
tural properties revealed by science, and it is no less parsimonious to suppose that 
it has a consciousness-involving rather than a non-consciousness-involving intrinsic 
nature.9
Smallism versus priority monism
Philosophers tend to assume that big things are grounded in little things; that a 
table, for example, exists and is the way it is because of complex facts about its most 
fundamental constituents and their arrangements. Let us call this widespread view 
‘smallism.’10 However, there is an alternative: priority monism, the view according 
to which little things are grounded in big things and ultimately everything exists and 
is that way it is because of facts about the universe as a whole (Schaffer 2009, 2010). 
For the priority monist, the universe is the one fundamental entity.
Russellian monism comes in both smallist and priority monist forms. For the 
smallist, fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by micro-level physical 
entities, perhaps electrons and quarks. For the priority monist, the most fundamental 
categorical properties are instantiated by the universe as a whole. By cross-section-
ing this distinction with the panpsychist/neutral distinction, we get four categories of 
Russellian monism:
8 Coleman (2016) offers a positive proposal concerning the intrinsic nature of matter. Pereboom (2011) 
hopes that we will one day theorise our way to a positive proposal. McGinn (1989), I believe, can be 
interpreted as a holding a form of neutral Russellian monism according to which humans are constitu-
tionally incapable of ever grasping the intrinsic nature of matter.
9 There are, for course, challenges for panpsychism, most notably the combination problem (Goff 2006, 
2009, 2017; Coleman 2014; Chalmers 2016). I have argued (Goff 2017: Ch. 7) that these are no greater 
than the problems facing neutral Russellian monism.
10 This term is from Coleman 2006.
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• Smallist panpsychism: Fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by 
micro-level entities and are consciousness-involving.
• Priority monist panpsychism (AKA constitutive cosmopsychism): Fundamental 
categorical properties are instantiated by the universe as a whole and are con-
sciousness-involving (Shani 2015; Nagasawa and Wager 2016; Goff 2017; Alba-
hari forthcoming).
• Smallist neutral monism: Fundamental categorical properties are instantiated by 
micro-level entities and are not consciousness-involving.
• Priority monist neutral monism: Fundamental categorical properties are instanti-
ated by the universe as a whole and are not consciousness-involving.11
Constitutive cosmopsychism is the form of Russellian monism which will be 
relevant for our purposes, as it is this view that I will argue can account for cos-
mic fine-tuning. I have in previous work defended constitutive cosmopsychism on 
independent grounds (Goff 2017). But I will assume here only that constitutive cos-
mopsychism is not obviously problematic or inferior to other forms of Russellian 
monism.12 If constitutive cosmopsychism can indeed offer us an explanation of cos-
mic fine-tuning, then this may in itself give us reason to prefer it.
II – The fine‑tuning problem
There are a number of parameters in the basic laws of physics and initial conditions 
of the universe that are such that, for life to be possible, the values of those param-
eters needed to fall in an exceedingly narrow range. As a result, the physical pos-
sibility of life, given the kind of laws we have, turns out to be extremely improbable.
Here are three examples:
• The strong nuclear force (the force that binds together the elements in the 
nucleus of an atom) has a value of 0.007. If that value had been 0.006 or less 
the universe would have contained nothing but hydrogen. If it had been 0.008 or 
higher the hydrogen would have fused to make heavier elements. In either case, 
11 The first ‘monism’ in this name refers to token-monism (there is only one fundamental individual), 
the second to type-monism (there is only one fundamental type of individual). As far as I know, nobody 
defends priority monist neutral monism.
12 Whereas smallist panpsychism faces the combination problem, constitutive cosmopsychism faces 
the de-combination problem: the challenge of making sense of how human and animal consciousness 
is grounded in the consciousness of the universe. I have argued (2017: Ch. 9) that there are plausible 
solutions to this worry. Even if the combination/de-combination problems turn out to be insoluble, there 
is always the option of adopting emergentist forms of these views (Mørch 2014; Shani 2015), accord-
ing to which human and animal consciousness causally arise from the consciousness of the cosmos and 
hence facts about human consciousness are not reducible to facts about the consciousness of the uni-
verse. The emergentist position may also be attractive if one wishes to accommodate libertarian free will. 
Some have argued that priority monism is at odds with contemporary science, e.g. Lowe 2012. How-
ever, Schaffer (2010) has argued that priority monism fits much better with the empirical phenomenon 
of quantum entanglement. Overall, it’s fair to say that there are no obvious disadvantages to constitutive 
cosmopsychism relative to other forms of Russellian monism.
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any kind of chemical complexity would have been physically impossible. And 
without chemical complexity there can be no life (Rees 2008: Ch. 4).
• The physical possibility of chemical complexity is also dependent on the masses of 
the basic components of matter: electrons and quarks. If the mass of a down quark 
had been greater by a factor of 3, the universe would have contained only hydrogen. 
If the mass of an electron had been greater by a factor of 2.5, the universe would 
have containing only neutrons: no atoms at all, and certainly no chemical reactions. 
In fact, it’s balanced on a knife edge: the mass-values compatible with chemical 
complexity fall within an extremely narrow range (Lewis and Barnes 2016: Ch. 2).
• Gravity seems a momentous force but it is actually much weaker than the other 
forces that affect atoms, by about  1036. This secures an important feature of our 
universe: astronomical processes have immense timespans relative to the basic 
microphysical timescales of physical and chemical reactions. If gravity had been 
only slightly stronger, relative to electromagnetism, stars would have formed 
from smaller amounts of material, and consequently would have been smaller 
with much shorter lives. A typical sun would have lasted around 10,000 years 
rather than 10 billion years, not allowing enough time for the evolutionary pro-
cesses that produce complex life. Conversely, if gravity had been only slightly 
weaker (and/or electromagnetism slightly stronger), stars would have been much 
colder and hence would not have exploded into supernovae. This also would have 
rendered life impossible, as supernovae are the main source of many of the heavy 
elements that form the ingredients of life (Lewis and Barnes 2016: Ch. 2).
Some take the fine-tuning to be simply a basic fact about our universe: fortunate per-
haps, but not something requiring explanation. But many scientists and philosophers find 
this implausible. Lee Smolin has estimated that, taking into account all of the fine-tun-
ing, the chance of life being physically possible in a universe with laws/initial conditions 
of the general form we find in our universe is 1 in  10229, from which he concludes, ‘In 
my opinion, a probability this tiny is not something we can let go unexplained. Luck will 
certainly not do here; we need some rational explanation of how something this unlikely 
turned out to be the case’ (Smolin 1999: 45, quoted in Ratzsch and Koperski 2015).13
In what follows I will assume the very common, although not uncontroversial, 
view that the fine-tuning needs to be explained (we will reflect a little more in sec-
tion IV on why it needs explaining). We are rationally obliged to give some account 
of why, seemingly against extraordinary odds, these parameters have precisely the 
values needed in order for life to be physically possible.14
13 There are some concerns with how to make sense of these probabilities. Attempts to address these 
concerns can be found in Collins 2009 and Hawthorne and Isaacs 2018. I intend to give my own account 
of the probabilities in question in future work.
14 In a recent unpublished paper, Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018) have argued that the fine-tuning argu-
ment is better expressed in terms of Bayesian probability theory. I agree that the deeper story of why the 
fine-tuning needs explaining should be put in Bayesian terms. However, I worry that setting things up 
this way will exclude everyone except techy academic philosophers from the discussion. For most pur-
poses it seems to me fine to discuss the fine-tuning in the ideology of inference to the best explanation, 
so long as one appreciates that there is a deeper Bayesian analysis.
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The two standard explanations of the fine-tuning are: theism and the multiverse 
hypothesis. Theists postulate an all-powerful, all-knowing and perfectly good super-
natural creator of the universe, and then explain the fine-tuning in terms of the good 
intentions of this creator.15 Life is something of great objective value; God in Her 
goodness wanted to bring about this great value, and hence created laws with param-
eters compatible with its physical possibility (Collins 2009; Hawthorne and Isaacs 
2018). The multiverse hypothesis postulates an enormous, perhaps infinite, num-
ber of physical universe other than our own, in which many different values of the 
parameters are realised. Given a sufficient number of universes realising a sufficient 
range of the parameters, it is not so improbable that there will be at least one uni-
verse with fine-tuned laws.16
Neither of these views is attractive. The multiverse hypothesis comes at great 
ontological cost, in postulating an enormous number of concrete, unobservable uni-
verses distinct from our own. All things being equal, a more parsimonious explana-
tion of fine-tuning would be preferable. It might be thought that theism is indeed 
more parsimonious, in postulating only one universe and one designer. However, 
whilst theism does not incur a large cost in terms of quantitative parsimony, it does 
incur a significant cost in terms qualitative parsimony.
Whereas quantitative parsimony is a matter of believing in as few token entities 
as possible, qualitative parsimony is a matter of believing in as few types of entity as 
possible. If the only difference between our theories of the world is that you believe 
that there are more electrons in the universe than I do, then our theories are equally 
matched as regards qualitative parsimony but mine is better as regards quantitative 
parsimony. On the other hand, if we agree about the number of particles in the uni-
verse but I believe they fall into 13 kinds and you believe they fall into 12 kinds, 
then our theories are equally matched as regards quantitative parsimony but yours is 
superior as regards qualitative parsimony. Qualitative parsimony is standardly taken 
to be a more important theoretical virtue than quantitative parsimony: a dualist who 
believes in few souls is more profligate than a materialist who believes in many bod-
ies (although ideally both forms of excess should be avoided).
Theism incurs great qualitative cost in so far as it postulates an immaterial and 
necessary being in addition to the physical and contingent universe.17 It also com-
mits to a radically dis-unified conception of reality, with the natural world entirely 
distinct from the supernatural God; and unity is itself an important theoretical virtue.
15 There are, of course, forms of theism that depart from this classical definition of theism, and some of 
them would avoid some of the criticisms I raise here against theism as standardly understood. Process 
theologians (Whitehead 1929; Hartshorne 1953), for example, deal with the problem of evil by denying 
that God is omnipotent.
16 Some examples of physicists who have taken the postulation of a multiverse to be a rational response 
to fine-tuning are Susskind 2005; Greene 2011; Tegmark 2014. Some philosophers who have argued for 
this are Smart 1989; Parfit 1998; Bradley 2009.
17 If we already take ourselves to be committed to mind–body dualism, then the parsimony concern with 
respect to theism is slightly weakened, as we are already committed to non-physical entities. However, 
the availability of Russellian monism significantly weakens the case for dualism.
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Even more significant than their profligacy is the fact that these theories make 
false predictions. For the theist, the false prediction arises from the problem of evil. 
If one were told that a given universe was created by an all-loving, all-knowing and 
all-powerful being, one would not expect that universe to contain enormous amounts 
of gratuitous suffering. One might not be surprised to find it contained intelligent 
life, but one would be surprised to learn that life had come about through the grue-
some process of natural selection. Why would a loving God who could do absolutely 
anything choose to create life that way? Prima facie theism predicts a universe that 
is much better than our own and, because of this, the flaws of our Universe count 
strongly against the existence of God.
Turning to the multiverse hypothesis, the false prediction arises from the so-
called Boltzmann brain problem, named after the 19th-century Austrian physicist 
Ludwig Boltzmann who first formulated this problem although in a different con-
text. Assuming there is a multiverse, you would expect our Universe to be a fairly 
typical member of the universe ensemble, or at least a fairly typical member of the 
universes containing observers (since we couldn’t find ourselves in a universe in 
which observers are impossible). However, Penrose (2004) has calculated that in the 
kind of multiverse most favoured by contemporary physicists—based on inflationary 
cosmology and string theory—for every observer who observes a smooth, orderly 
universe as big as ours, there are 10 to the power of  10123 who observe a smooth, 
orderly universe that is just 10 times smaller. And by far the most common kind of 
observer would be a ‘Boltzmann’s brain’: a functioning brain that has by sheer fluke 
emerged from a disordered universe for a brief period of time. If Penrose is right, 
then the odds of an observer in the multiverse theory finding itself in a large, ordered 
universe are astronomically small. Many physicists take the fact that we find our-
selves in such a universe to be a powerful disconfirmation of the multiverse theory.
Neither of these are knock-down arguments. Theists can try to come up with rea-
sons why God would allow the suffering we find in the Universe, and multiverse the-
orists can try to fine-tune their theory such that our Universe is less unlikely. How-
ever, this can seem like special pleading or ad hoc alterations, desperate attempts to 
try to save the theory rather than accepting that, on its most natural interpretation, 
the theory is falsified. I think we can do better.
III – Agentive cosmopsychism
Constitutive cosmopsychism is a form of Russellian monism according to which (i) 
all facts are grounded in facts about the universe as a whole, (ii) the universe instan-
tiates consciousness-involving categorical properties. Two modifications to the basic 
position are required if we want a view that can account for fine-tuning. In what fol-
lows I will outline these two modifications.
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First modification: universe as agent
According to constitutive comopsychism, the universe is a conscious subject. All 
other things—from planets to human beings to fundamental particles—are con-
scious subjects that exist as proper parts of the universe subject.18 We tend to think 
of wholes as ‘built up’ from parts. But for the constitutive cosmopsychist, it goes the 
other way around: facts about the proper parts of the universe are grounded in facts 
about the universe as a whole. The conscious universe is the ground of all being. It 
is certainly strange to think of one conscious subject being a proper part of another 
conscious subject, and it doesn’t seem to be something we can positively imagine; 
but there is no contradiction or incoherence in the idea. Compare: we cannot imag-
ine four-dimensional spacetime, but this gives us no reason to doubt the truth of 
general relativity.19
The claim that the universe is conscious does not imply that it has any of the 
sophisticated mental features enjoyed by human beings, such as thought, intelli-
gence and agency. In our case, these mental phenomena are the result of millions 
of years of evolution; one might doubt that they could also be properties of things, 
such as the universe, which have not evolved through natural selection. Indeed, in 
previous work (Goff 2017), I suggested that the cosmopsychist conceive of the con-
sciousness of the universe as being a ‘mess’ entirely lacking in elements of thought 
and rationality.
However, so long as we think of the causal capacities of the universe as entirely 
non-rational, it is unlikely that we will be able to explain fine-tuning. We could sup-
pose that the universe has a disposition to develop laws with fine-tuned values. But 
if the universe is entirely non-rational, then the fact that it is disposed to develop 
laws with exactly those parameter-values required for life is going to remain an 
intolerable fluke.
Therefore, it seems likely that if the cosmopsychist wants to account for the fine-
tuning, she must suppose not only that the universe is conscious, but that it is a con-
scious agent of some kind. By a ‘conscious agent’ I mean something with the capac-
ity to recognise and respond to reasons or facts about value. Most human beings are 
agents in this sense. Although we are sometimes compelled to act by non-rational 
impulses, such as when driven by hunger or lust, most of the time we choose to do 
things because we think they are in some way worthwhile. In some cases, the motive 
may be the more lofty aim of making the world a better place. But even in mundane 
cases of choosing a restaurant, in general we recognise considerations that count in 
favour of the choice, e.g. that it would be pleasant and enjoyable. This is not to say 
that in general we act for the best reason, nor that our choices are not shaped by non-
rational impulses. It is just to say that we are not creatures that are simply pushed 
18 Strictly speaking, this is not quite correct. In the form of constitutive cosmopsychism I defend in Goff 
2017, some entities will admit of analysis, and we needn’t think of those entities as themselves subject of 
experience. For example, we can analyse facts about parties into facts about people revelling, and conse-
quently we don’t need to postulate a subject of experience that is the party.
19 I defend the coherence of constitutive cosmopsychism in much more detail in Goff 2017: Ch. 9.
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and pulled by instinctive drives; we act to a large part on the basis of normative 
judgements about reasons.20
It is generally assumed that human agency is grounded in complex facts about 
our physical makeup, and I will not here question this assumption. However, we 
can conceive of possible creatures with a basic capacity to recognise and respond 
to reasons not grounded in anything more fundamental. This is, for example, the 
way we think about God or immaterial angels. It is also coherent to suppose that 
there are physical creatures with such a basic capacity; on certain emergentist views, 
the human capacity to recognise and respond to reasons is basic and ungrounded 
(O’Connor 2002).
The first modification I will be proposing is that the universe, although physi-
cal, acts, and only acts, through a basic capacity to recognise and respond to rea-
sons. This is a strange proposal relative to how we ordinarily think about things. But 
it is arguably consistent with everything we can observe. It is commonly accepted 
that Hume was correct at least about the epistemology of causation. All that we can 
directly perceive in the world is the regular behaviour of physical things; we cannot 
directly observe the natural necessity that underlies those regularities: that which 
‘breathes fire into the equations’, to use Stephen Hawking’s memorable phrase 
(Hawking 1988). It could be, as is standardly assumed, that micro-level physical 
properties have their own causal powers, and that it is the operation of these causal 
powers that ‘runs the show’. But it could also be that it is the decisions of the uni-
verse that run the show.21
Two objections may occur at this point, which it would be useful to consider 
together:
1. How do the laws of physics fit into this picture? If the universe acts through a 
basic capacity to recognise and respond to reasons, and all facts are grounded in 
facts about the universe, the laws of physics seem to be irrelevant to the causal 
evolution of the universe.
2. If the universe acts through recognising and responding to reasons, why do bad 
things happen, things which the universe would have presumably have over-
whelming reason to prevent? This question invites a problem of evil analogous 
to that facing the theist.
Let me answer both of these questions at once by further clarifying the position. 
In contrast to the theist, the agentive cosmopsychist need not take the universe to be 
all-powerful. Rather she can take the laws of physics to record the limitations of the 
universe’s capacity to act. On this interpretation, everything that happens is deter-
mined by the rational choices of the universe, but the universe can only do what is 
20 I am working with the conception of human agency laid out in more detail in Scanlon 1998 and 
Dancy 2000.
21 Given that it offers an explanation of the fundamental regularities of the universe, in terms of the uni-
verse’s responsiveness to value, agentive cosmopsychism is by definition opposed to Humean accounts of 
laws and causation. This is not an especially controversial commitment.
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physically possible, i.e. what is consistent with what the laws of physics state to be 
possible at any given time, given the properties of the universe at that time.22
This proposal might seem obscure and ad hoc. If the universe is the one funda-
mental entity and the sole arbiter of everything that happens, what could possibly 
restrict its ability to do what it wants? Proposing that the universe is shackled by ‘the 
laws of physics’ might seem to be an arbitrary way of avoiding the fact that the uni-
verse doesn’t look like a place that has been shaped by a rational agent.
I would reply that this proposal is no more obscure or ad hoc than any other view 
about the fundamental causal workings of the universe. We know that the universe 
evolves according to certain laws. Why does this happen? Many philosophers pos-
tulate basic causal capacities defined such as to result in the universe we observe.23 
The agentive cosmopsychist postulates a limited capacity to rationally act, defined 
such as to result in the universe we observe: the universe has a capacity to act for 
reasons but is limited in the options from which it can choose. Perhaps the influence 
of Western religion makes us prone to think of fundamental agents as having unlim-
ited power, but there seems to be no incoherence in the idea of a fundamental agent 
with limited power.24
Of course, we should not adopt this view unless we have good grounds for doing 
so. But there is, I submit, a reason to take this proposal seriously: its capacity to 
explain the fine-tuning. Just as the theist explains the fine-tuning in terms of God’s 
recognition and responsiveness to the fact that it would be good to have a universe 
containing life, so the agentive cosmopsychist can explain the fine-tuning in terms 
of the universe’s recognition and responsiveness to this same normative fact. (We 
will explore agentive explanations of fine-tuning in more detail in section IV.)
More needs to be said. We can make sense of the idea that a creator who pre-
cedes the existence of the universe can shape its laws, by bringing into existence a 
universe with the laws it wants. But if the cosmic fine-tuner just is the universe, and 
hence presumably has existed only as long as the universe has, the question naturally 
arises: When was the fine-tuning done?
In fact, physics does not compel us to the idea that the fine-tuning existed from 
the first moments of the universe’s existence. Our current models can tell us very lit-
tle about the very first period of cosmological history: the so-called ‘Planck epoch’, 
lasting  10−43 of a second. The agentive cosmopsychist can propose that it was dur-
ing this period that the universe chose fine-tuned values of the parameters and initial 
conditions (or rather, the conditions that obtained after the Planck epoch). The idea 
would be that in this early period of the universe, the universe had a constrained 
22 Given that the universe is constrained by principles of conservation of energy, it cannot create or 
destroy matter, and hence can only act to alter itself.
23 Some take these causal capacities to be metaphysically basic (Bird 2007; Ellis 2001, 2002; Molnar 
2003; Mumford 2004), but most Russellian monists take them to be grounded in categorical properties 
(Perebooom 2011; Chalmers 2015; Goff 2017).
24 As I explain below, I agree with Swinburne (2004) that considerations of simplicity favour an all-
powerful fundamental agent; the point I am making here is about coherence. I explain below why overall 
I favour agentive cosmopsychism over theism.
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capacity to determine what its nature and its causal capacities would be after the 
Planck epoch:
• The laws that operated in the Planck epoch determined the form of the laws and 
initial conditions that would operate subsequently (the form we reach by taking 
the post-Planck epoch laws/initial conditions and abstracting away from the spe-
cific numerical values of their parameters) but did not determine the values of 
the parameters contained within them.
• The universe made it the case that the values of those parameters are compatible 
with the possibility of intelligent life, and it did this because intelligent life is of 
great value.25
This may seem wildly speculative mystery-mongering, exploiting the limitations 
of our models to describe the first split second of the universe. But our best current 
science tells us that the universe emerged from the Planck epoch with fine-tuned 
laws and conditions. The only question is what is the best explanation of this. If the 
proposal of the agentive cosmopsychist—including the above hypothesis concerning 
what happened in the Planck epoch—is more parsimonious either than the postula-
tion of a multiverse or of a supernatural God, then a case can be made for that pro-
posal on the basis of its being the best explanation of the fine-tuning. More on this 
below.
The basic outline of the proposal should now be clear. But before we assess its 
theoretical virtue relative to the two standard explanations of fine-tuning, there is 
one more crucial modification required.
2nd modification: representing the future
I will argue in section V that the first modification comes at negligible ontological 
cost. However, this is sadly not true of the second modification. If, during the Plank 
epoch, the early universe fine-tuned the laws to bring about life billions of years 
in the future, then it must have in some sense known, or been aware, of the future 
consequences of its actions. In other words, to make sense of the idea that the early 
universe fine-tuned the laws and initial conditions in order to bring about life, we 
25 The hardest bit of fine-tuning to fit into this model of explanation is the low entropy at the start of 
the universe. The level of entropy is determined by the arrangement of matter. Therefore, it’s natural to 
suppose that if the universe intentionally determined what the level of entropy would be after the Planck 
epoch, she must have done this by determining the precise arrangement of matter. But if the universe had 
complete freedom to determine the arrangement of matter post-Planck epoch, then presumably she could 
have made reality much better than it actually is; thus, the problem of evil again raises its ugly head. It 
seems to me that we need to say that the universe had the power to determine the level of entropy but 
lacked the power to determine the precise arrangement of matter that would realise that level of entropy 
(thanks to Barry Loewer and Luke Barnes for help with this point). How is this possible? Perhaps the 
universe has the power to create a superposition of many different states of matter each of which has the 
same level of entropy, a superposition which subsequently collapses into one of those determinate states 
such that it is completely random which determinate state it will collapse into.
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need to make sense of the idea that the universe has mental states that represent the 
future.
I propose that the agentive cosmopsychist should suppose that the universe has 
a basic disposition to form spontaneous mental representations of the complete 
future consequences of all of the choices available to it. In a sense, this is a very 
simple postulation, in that the fundamental description of the disposition itself is 
simple. But I don’t think it can be denied that the mental representations themselves, 
which result from the exercise of the disposition, add considerably to the cost of the 
theory.26
However, crucially, this cost is less than the cost incurred through the postula-
tion of a multiverse. The proposed representational states of the universe involve 
great structural complexity, as will the postulation of a multiverse. However, there 
are important differences between the two proposals:
• On the multiverse hypothesis, the structural complexity is realised by an astro-
nomical number of distinct individuals; on agentive cosmopsychism, the struc-
tural complexity is realised by the properties of a single individual.
• The multiverse hypothesis postulates an enormous number of individuals that 
we cannot directly observe; agentive cosmopsychism does not postulate a single 
new individual: it merely adds properties to an individual we already believe in, 
namely the physical universe. If we are already committed to constitutive cos-
mopsychism, this second modification merely adds to the complexity of the uni-
verse’s consciousness.
I do not deny that this second modification, crucial for my proposal, comes at a 
cost. But it is less of a cost, I believe, than the multiverse hypothesis. This will be 
important in section V, in which I ague that agentive cosmopsychism offers a better 
explanation of fine-tuning than its rivals.
26 I don’t think it would be implausible for the agentive cosmopsychist simply to take this disposition 
as basic, just as the theist takes the omniscience of God as basic. However, I also have some thoughts 
about a possible account of it in more basic terms. It could be that this disposition is grounded in the 
universe’s having an acquaintance-based grasp of its causal power, i.e. of its limited capacity to recognise 
and respond to reasons. Grasping the nature of a causal power involves grasping the states of affairs that 
that causal capacity has the potential to produce. And hence, through grasping the nature of its causal 
power at time T1, the universe would grasp the possible states of affairs that it has the power to pro-
duce at T2. Presumably, each of those possible states of affairs that might exist at T2 would involves the 
universe’s having a certain causal power at T2. Thus, the universe at T1, in grasping the possible states 
of affairs it has the power to produce at T2, would thereby grasp the nature of all of the possible causal 
powers it could have at T2 (which causal power it will have will presumably depend on which choice it 
makes); and if the universe at T1 grasps its causal power at T2, then it has—by the same line of reason-
ing employed above—a grasp of the potential states of affairs that at T2 it would have the power to bring 
about at T3. Its grasp of these potential states of affairs will afford it a grasp of the possible states off 
affairs that at T3 it will have the power to bring about at T4, and so on ad infinitum.
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IV – Can fundamental agents explain the fine‑tuning?
In the next section, we will examine whether agentive cosmopsychism offers the best 
explanation of the fine-tuning. In this section, we will examine the prior question 
of whether it constitutes an explanation at all; more specifically, we will examine 
whether the postulation of fundamental agents—whether of the theistic or comopsy-
chist variety—can explain the fine-tuning. I will begin by reflecting in a little more 
detail on the question of why we want an explanation of the fine-tuning in the first 
place.
In attempting to answer this question, most point to the extreme improbability of 
the fine-tuning. But whilst the fine-tuning is indeed extremely improbable, any com-
bination of the parameter-values in question would be improbable; and, of course, 
each parameter had to have some value of other. Why then do we think that the fact 
that they turned out to have these values, rather than some other combination, needs 
explaining?
It is important to distinguish between something’s being improbable, and some-
thing’s being such that it’s improbable that it happened by chance.27 Consider a ran-
dom arrangement of pebbles on a beach. The fact that the pebbles happened to fall 
into that exact arrangement, of all the locations each might have had, is extremely 
improbable. But we don’t think that this precise arrangement of pebbles requires 
explanation, as we don’t find it improbable that it came about by chance. In order 
for some event to be not only improbable but also improbable that it happened by 
chance, it must be in some way marked out from all other possibilities. Suppose 
the pebbles clearly formed a complicated English word. Although this arrangement 
of pebbles is in a sense as improbable as any other arrangement, we would find it 
improbable that this happened by chance. We would seek an explanation, such as the 
hypothesis that someone had arranged them that way.
Returning to the topic at hand, suppose the strong nuclear force had turned out to 
have a value of 0.009 (rather than the fine-tuned value of 0.007). That would have 
been extremely improbable: Of all the values it could have had, it turned out to have 
exactly that value. But this fact would not have needed explaining.28 For there is 
nothing that marks out that value from other values, so as to incline us to think it 
improbable that the strong nuclear force had that value by chance.
The reason we think that the value of 0.007 needs explaining is, of course, that it 
is the value required for life. But pointing this out just pushes the lump to another 
part of the carpet, for we now need to ask what’s so special about life. If the strong 
nuclear force had the value 0.009, then presumably this would have made a differ-
ence; let us imagine that only in universes with a strong nuclear force of 0.009 are 
there precisely  1080 neutrons. We could then say that a value of 0.009 is ‘fine-tuned’ 
27 In the discussion of this paragraph, I am largely following the approach and examples employed by 
White (2007) in a slightly different context.
28 Of course, there would have been no one about to explain or not explain the value of the strong 
nuclear force in a universe in which its value is 0.009. Nonetheless, I am assuming that whether or not a 
given phenomenon requires explanation is not determined by the preferences or actions of human beings.
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to allow a world with precisely  1080 neutrons, just as in our world the strong nuclear 
force is fine-tuned to allow a world with life. Still, it would not cry out for explana-
tion if the strong nuclear force was ‘fine-tuned’ for this result, as there is nothing 
special about there being precisely  1080 neutrons.
The difference is that life, and ultimately intelligent life, is of great value. With-
out life, and especially without intelligent life, the universe would have had infinitely 
less value than it actually does; indeed, it is not implausible that it would have had 
no value. The fact that the strong nuclear force is precisely 0.007 is remarkable not 
simply because it is improbable (any number would have been equally improbable), 
but because it is precisely the number needed for allowing the universe to be a place 
of great value. More generally, of all the values the parameters of the laws/initial 
conditions might have had, they turned out to have exactly the values required to 
allow the universe to be a wonderful place. It is this that many cannot accept as a 
fluke.29
The commitment to explaining fine-tuning, then, is dependent on a commitment 
to life/intelligent life being of great value. Moreover, the value in question must be 
of a fairly robust kind. Many philosophers hold that facts about value are depend-
ent in some way on human preference or practices. But if the value of life is, in 
this way, in the eye of the beholder, then it is hard to see why the fine-tuning would 
need explaining. My existence is special to me in a way the existence of anyone else 
isn’t (let’s suppose). My existence is also extremely improbable; if any of my many 
great, great, great grandparents hadn’t met, I would never have existed. And yet we 
don’t think the fact that, against all the odds, I exist requires explanation, precisely 
because there’s nothing objectively special about my existence as opposed to the 
existence of any other human being. Similarly, unless life/intelligent life is objec-
tively of great value, the fine-tuning needs no explanation.30
29 As I said in footnote 14, I agree with Hawthorne and Isaacs (2018) that the deeper story of why the 
fine-tuning needs explaining should be put in Bayesian terms but that I also think for most purposes I 
think it’s fine to discuss the fine-tuning in terms of the ideology of inference to the best explanation. 
Moreover, I still think we need to commit to the objectivity of value when giving the Bayesian fine-
tuning argument for design, in order to answer the worries about the motivations of the cosmic agent 
discussed in the rest of this section. If there is something objectively valuable about life, then fine-tuning 
is more likely conditional on the laws/initial conditions having been chosen by an agent than it is con-
ditional on the laws/initial conditions having a non-agential cause or no cause at all. If there is nothing 
objectively valuable about life, then a cosmic agent may happen to like life but may equally happen to 
like random chaos; and therefore the probability of the fine-tuning conditional on the laws/initial condi-
tions having an agential cause is no greater than the probability of the fine-tuning conditional on the 
laws/initial conditions having a non-agential cause. Something along these lines is, I think, the correct 
response to the challenge (considered by Hawthorne and Isaacs) to the proponent of the fine-tuning argu-
ment for God to explain why the fine-tuning does not support the existence of a God with a Tungsten 
fetish.
30 The dependence of fine-tuning arguments on objective value is explored and defended in Mulgan 
2015. The value subjectivist proponent of the fine-tuning argument might respond in the following way: 
What needs explaining is that the fact that the laws of nature mirror our preferences; we value life, and 
the laws of nature are, against all the odds, fine-tuned for life. However, it is inevitable (or at least highly 
likely) that evolved creatures will value life, and the existence of life is impossible without fine-tuned 
laws. And thus, we do not need an explanation as to why these two things—the fine-tuning and the fact 
that humans value life—have met in the same universe.
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The fact that the commitment to explaining fine-tuning involves a commitment to 
objective value is important when responding to a certain form of objection to agen-
tive explanations of fine-tuning (of course, the target is usually taken to be God, but 
the same form of objection would apply equally to natural agents). The objection I 
have in mind is that we have no grounds for making assumptions about how a divine 
or cosmic agent is likely to act. Elliot Sober puts it as follows:
Our judgements about what counts as a sign of intelligent design must be 
based on empirical information about what designers often do and what they 
rarely do. As of now, these judgements are based on our knowledge of human 
intelligence. The more our hypotheses of intelligent designers depart from the 
human case, the more in the dark we are as to what the ground rules are for 
inferring intelligent design (Sober 2003: 38).
This objection might a good one if we are thinking of motivation along Humean 
lines, i.e. that agents are ultimately motivated by basic desires, basic in the sense 
that the agent did not adopt those desires on rational grounds. But this is not the way 
I am thinking of the cosmic agent. The cosmic agent acts not from a pre-existing 
stock of brute desires, but because she recognises what she has reason to do.31 Given 
this non-Humean understanding of the cosmic agent’s agency, we are in a position 
to predict her motivations: she is likely to be motivated to promote what is of value.
Richard Swinburne has argued that an agent who knows the normative truth, and 
who is not subject to non-rational influences, will inevitably perform the best pos-
sible action [if there is one (Swinburne 2004: Ch. 5)]. If she knows what she has 
overwhelming reason to do, and there are no desires pressing her in another direc-
tion, then why on earth wouldn’t she do it? Perhaps Swinburne exaggerates, but it 
is certainly not surprising or unlikely that an agent with a capacity to recognise and 
respond to reasons should be motivated to do what she has reason to do. In so far as 
we think life is of great objective value, then it is likely that a (non-Humean) cosmic 
agent would be motivated to bring it about.
Or at least this is the case assuming that the cosmic agent’s capacity to recog-
nise and respond to reasons works well. What right do we have to suppose that? 
And what right do we have to suppose that the cosmic agent is not subject to irra-
tional desires? These are all possibilities, but they are not all equally simple. Rich-
ard Swinburne points out that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, scientific 
practice has exhibited a preference for the values of zero and infinite over values in 
between, on the basis of their greater simplicity:
…the hypothesis that some particle has zero mass, or infinite velocity, is much 
simpler than the hypothesis that it has a mass of 0.34127 of some unit, or a 
velocity of 301,000 km/sec. A finite limitation cries out for an explanation of 
why there is just that particular limit, in a way that limitlessness does not. And 
scientific practice shows this preference for infinite values over finite values 
of a property. It preferred to postulate that light had an infinite velocity rather 
31 Given that the cosmic agent is a person, it seems appropriate to refer to her with a personal pronoun.
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than a particular large finite velocity – for example, 301,000 km/sec. – until 
data found that were very improbable on the former hypothesis…And…[sci-
entists]…have always preferred hypotheses that some particle had zero mass to 
hypotheses that it had some very small mass, when both were equally compat-
ible with the data. There is a neatness about zero and infinite that particular 
finite numbers lack (Swinburne 2004: 55 and 97).
With reference to these kind of considerations, Swinburne argues that the pos-
tulation of an all-knowing and all-powerful divine being is much simpler than the 
postulation of a divine being with some arbitrary limit to its knowledge or power 
(Swinburne: 2004: Ch. 5). Along similar lines, I submit that the hypothesis that the 
universe has a flawless capacity to recognise and respond to reasons is much simpler 
than the hypothesis that this capacity of the universe has some arbitrary flaw; like-
wise, the hypothesis that the universe is not subject to irrational desires is simpler 
than the hypothesis that it is.32 In the absence of any reason to believe a more com-
plex hypothesis, a simpler one is to be preferred.
Along similar lines, I am inclined to think that the postulation of an evil or irra-
tional cosmic agent to explain the suffering and imperfections of the world is inferior 
to the postulation of a cosmic agent of limited power. In his ‘evil God challenge’, 
Stephen Law demands of the theist an explanation of why an evil God is less likely 
than a good God (Law 2010). One could argue that the good in the world allows us 
to rule out an evil God, but such a case would seem to mirror the familiar argument 
that the evil in the world rules out a good God. Whilst I agree that the problem of 
evil makes theism untenable, I do think a case can be made that an evil divine agent 
is less likely than a good one, at least if we have a non-Humean understanding of 
divine agency. On a Humean conception of the divine agent, God could have any 
desires whatsoever, and an evil God is just as likely as a good God.33 However, if 
the evil God is a non-Humean agent, then there must be some explanation of her evil 
motivations. Perhaps her capacity to recognise reasons is in some way flawed; per-
haps she is subject to irrational desires; perhaps there is a mixture of the two. In any 
case, a theory that postulates an evil God must tell some such story, and moreover 
it must be one that predicts the universe as we find it. Such a theory is going to end 
up extremely complicated. My preferred story—that the cosmic agent has a flawless 
capacity to recognise and respond to reasons but has power-limitations expressed by 
the laws of physics—is much simpler.
32 My argument here is very much influenced by Swinburne 2004, but I disagree with him in two 
respects: (i) Although the ascription of omniscience is, in a sense, very simple, I agree with Richard 
Dawkins (2006: Ch 4) that the complex representational states of God entailed by Her omniscience con-
stitute a significant cost to theism (similarly, my cosmic agent’s awareness of the future involves signifi-
cant cost), (ii) Although there is a simplicity-based consideration in favour of omnipotence, the existence 
of evil renders it more probable overall that the fundamental agent (if there is one) has limited power.
33 I am setting aside for the sake of this discussion other arguments that might give us reason to think 
that God is perfectly good, such as the ontological argument.
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To emphasise, I am not assuming a non-Humean view of human agency, only 
of cosmic agency.34 I am assuming a commitment to objective value. But, as I 
have argued, one already has that commitment if one is committed to explaining 
fine-tuning.
With the non-Humean conception of the cosmic agent in place, the agentive cos-
mopsychist’s explanation of the fine-tuning is straightforward. It is not left an intol-
erable fluke that, of all the values the parameters might have had, they turned out 
to have exactly the values required to make a universe of value; rather this fact is 
explained in terms of the rational responsiveness of a cosmic agent of limited power.
V – Why agentive cosmopsychism offers the best explanation 
of the fine‑tuning
If the fine-tuning needs explaining, which I’m assuming it does, and there are multi-
ple hypotheses that explain it, then we must try to assess without prejudice which is 
the best hypothesis. I will assume:
 (i) that all three hypothesis we have considered—theism, the multiverse hypoth-
esis and agentive cosmopsychism—explain the fine-tuning, in the sense of 
rendering it not an implausible fluke,35
   and hence:
 (ii) that we must decide which is the best explanation on the basis of (A) compari-
sons of theoretical virtue, such as parsimony (and simplicity more generally), 
elegance and unity, and (B) other advantages or disadvantages of each theory.
I will begin by assessing the relative theoretical virtue of the theories, before 
turning to other considerations.
Agentive cosmosychism is clearly more theoretically virtuous than theism. Both 
postulate a fundamental mind. But the fundamental mind postulated by theism is 
supernatural, immaterial and metaphysically necessary, leading to a disunified the-
ory (God on the one hand, the natural universe on the other) and a significant cost 
in terms of qualitative parsimony (a commitment to both physical and non-physical 
kinds, and to both necessary and contingent kinds). Agentive cosmopsychism, in 
supposing that this fundamental agent is the intrinsic nature of the contingent, physi-
cal universe, avoids these costs.
How does agentive cosmopsychism fare in comparison to the multiverse hypoth-
esis, as regards theoretical virtue? I have already argued that the second modifica-
tion to turn constitutive cosmopsychism into agentive cosmopsychism incurs less 
cost than the multiverse hypothesis. But perhaps one might think that the first 
34 In Goff 2018 I provide grounds for accepting a non-Humean account of human agency. This could 
provide further support for agentive cosmopsychism: if we already have a commitment to human non-
Humean agency, then the postulation of non-Humean cosmic agency is not a wholly new commitment.
35 I am assuming for the sake of discussion that the multiverse would explain the fine-tuning. In fact, 
there is reason to doubt this: see, for example, White 2000. I am currently working on a paper on the 
White argument.
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modification, or a basic commitment to Russellian monism itself, incurs more of a 
cost than a commitment to the multiverse hypothesis. Let us take these in turn.
I can see no grounds for thinking that constitutive cosmopsychism is more costly 
than any other form of Russellian monism. Priority monism is not more costly than 
smallism: if anything it’s much cheaper, as there’s only one fundamental thing! And 
a Russellian monist priority monist has to think there’s some intrinsic nature to the 
cosmos. I can’t see why the supposition that its intrinsic nature is consciousness-
involving is any less costly than the supposition that it involves some non-conscious-
ness-involving intrinsic nature (and if my simplicity argument for panpsychism goes 
through, it’s less costly).
What about the move from cosmopsychism in which the universe is a non-
rational ‘mess’—call this ‘standard cosmopsychism’—to cosmopsychism in which 
the universe is a rational agent (the first modification described above)? It is difficult 
to reflect on this question dispassionately, as we are strongly inclined for cultural 
reasons to think of the thesis that the universe is an agent as a ludicrously extrava-
gant cartoon. But recall that agentive cosmopsychism is consistent with everything 
we can observe, and if we do manage to dispassionately assess its relative parsi-
mony, it is not obvious that the transition to it—at least once one is already a Russel-
lian monist—involves any cost at all.
After all, the (non-Humean)36 Russellian monist priority monist must make 
some postulation to account for the natural necessity that drives the universe; let 
us assume (reflecting the norm) that the standard cosmopsychist attributes to the 
universe multiple non-rational causal powers, in virtue of which the universe brings 
into being future states of itself in response to present states of itself. The agentive 
cosmopsychist instead postulates a limited capacity to recognise and respond to rea-
sons. Which postulation is simpler? There are consideration of parsimony favouring 
each option:
• Considerations in favour of Standard Cosmopsychism—The causal capacity pos-
tulated by the agentive cosmopsychist is perhaps a little more complex than any 
single non-rational disposition, in that it involves a recognitional state (recognis-
ing that one has reason to φ) and a responsive state (responding to that reason by 
φing).
• Considerations in favour of Agentive Cosmopsychism—The agentive cosmopsy-
chist postulates only one causal capacity rather than multiple.37
36 As I explained in footnote 21, agentive cosmopsychism involves a commitment to non-Humeanism 
about causation. This is not an especially contentious theoretical preference.
37 On agentive cosmopsychism, the specification of the constraints of the universe’s rational causal 
capacity—which express the complete laws of fundamental physics—will be more complex than the 
specification of any single causal power postulaedt by the standard cosmopsychist. But the complexity 
involved in specifying the fundamental power postulated by the agentive cosmopsychist will mirror the 
complexity of the causal powers postulated by the standard cosmopsychist taken as a whole (for those 
causal powers, as a whole, express the complete laws of physics). In this respect, the two hypotheses are 
equally complex. In saying that the agentive cosmopsychist ‘postulates only one causal capacity’ I was 
setting aside the second modification discussed in section III, which we have already (in section III) com-
pared in cost to the multiverse hypothesis.
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In my judgment, the postulations of the agentive cosmopsychist are overall sim-
pler. Perhaps some will disagree, but there is clearly not much in it. Even if the move 
from standard cosmopsychism to agentive cosmopsychism does involve a cost, that 
cost is negligible. When compared to other forms of Russellian monism, basic agen-
tive cosmopsychism (i.e. cosmopsychism with the first modification) is not espe-
cially costly.
What of the cost simply of being a Russellian monist, or more specifically of 
postulating an intrinsic nature to physical reality, rather than just believing in the 
causal-structural properties postulated by physical science? If the regress argument 
against causal structuralism discussed earlier is sound, then we have no choice but to 
postulate an intrinsic nature to matter. Even if that argument isn’t sound, the advan-
tages of Russellian monism in terms of accounting for consciousness may make it 
worth postulating an intrinsic nature to physical reality. But suppose one rejects all 
independent reasons to postulate an intrinsic nature to matter (the regress argument 
and the knowledge/conceivability arguments that try to show that consciousness 
can’t be explained in causal-structural terms) and is just looking for an explanation 
of the fine-tuning. Is it better to go for the multiverse hypothesis or agentive cos-
mopsychism? This is tough judgment call, but it seems to me overall better to add a 
little to the universe we have rather than to invest in an astronomical number of extra 
universes.
Moving on from considerations of theoretical virtue, the most significant advan-
tage of agentive cosmopsychism is that it avoids the false predictions of its rivals. 
It is not subject to Penrose’s Boltzmann brain problem, discussed above. And as 
regards the problem of evil, the agentive panpsychist is able to explain the imper-
fections of reality in terms of the limited powers of the universe. Indeed, she might 
plausibly claim that the universe made reality as good as possible given its limited 
powers.
Perhaps one could argue that there are certain possible values of the parameters 
of our physics that would have made the universe significantly better and press a 
problem evil against agentive cosmopsychism on this basis, but in the absence of 
such an argument it is not clear that agentive cosmopsychism faces any difficulty 
in this area. Even if such an argument could be pressed, it’s possible that it could 
be countered by further qualifying the powers of the universe; we’d have to see the 
details. In any case, agentive cosmopsychism is in a significantly better position than 
theism with respect to the existence of evil and suffering.
Perhaps the theist may further support the existence of God with other arguments 
of natural theology, with the hope of showing that overall theism is to be preferred. I 
obviously do not have space here to consider all such possible strategies, and so will 
confine myself to making brief comments about the two other most discussed argu-
ments for God: the ontological argument and the cosmological argument:
The ontological argument
If the ontological argument is sound, then the necessary existence of God can be 
demonstrated a priori, and hence the fine-tuning argument for God is redundant.
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The cosmological argument
Suppose the cosmological argument is able to demonstrate the existence of a time-
less and necessarily existent cause of the big bang. In this case, the agentive cos-
mopsychist can accommodate this finding by adopting the following two theses:
• the entity E that is the physical universe exists necessarily and has its spatiotem-
poral properties contingently (i.e. ‘physical universe’ is a phase sortal of E as 
‘adulthood’ is a phase sortal of a person),
• E as a non-spatiotemporal entity caused the big bang (i.e. the non-physical phase 
of E caused its physical phase).38
Given that physical science tells us nothing of the intrinsic nature of the universe, 
physical science can give us no grounds for holding that something with such an 
intrinsic nature is essentially spatiotemporal. In this way, the agentive cosmopsychist 
is able to avoid both the theistic problem of evil and a vicious dichotomy between 
God and the universe. In other words, one can accept the finding of the cosmologi-
cal argument whilst still avoiding the profligate and problematic implications of the-
ism.39 Of course, the cosmological argument may not demonstrate anything signifi-
cant at all, in which case a contingentist form of agentive cosmopsychism will have 
even more of an advantage over theism in terms of parsimony.40
VI – Conclusion
I have argued not only that agentive cosmopsychism can explain the fine-tuning, but 
that it offers an explanation superior to its two main rivals: theism and the multi-
verse hypothesis. Those who accept the need to explain fine-tuning ought to take the 
view seriously.41
38 Obviously we need to read ‘phase’ talk here in such a way that a phase can be non-temporal. If one is 
in doubt about the coherence of this, one can just stick to what is outside of the brackets.
39 Craig (1991) argues that a timeless cause of the universe must be personal. I don’t find these argu-
ments persuasive, but in any case, the agentive cosmopsychist can accept their conclusions. There isn’t, 
as far as I can see, anything in the cosmological argument that gives us grounds for believing that the 
cause of the universe is omnipotent or that that entity is presently supernatural.
40 I lay out this position in more detail in Goff (forthcoming).
41 This paper was written with support from a Summer Stipend from the Templeton project ‘Pantheism 
and Panentheism’. I am grateful for comments from Yujin Nagasawa, Andrei Buckareff, Hedda Hassel 
Mørch, Barry Loewer, Luke Barnes, David Chalmers, Emma Bullock, Fana Schiefen, Godehard Brün-
trup, Ludwig Jaskolla, Benedikt Göcke, two anonymous reviewers and participants at ‘Idealism and the 
Mind–Body Problem’, NYU Shanghai June 2017, ‘Panpsychism and Panentheism’, Catholic Academy 
of Schwerte February 2018, and at my presentation of this paper at the Ian Ramsey Centre, University 
of Oxford, March 2018, as part of the ‘God, Good and Evil, in a Scientific Age’ series. After publishing 
a popular version of this article, I was contacted by Justin Gaudry, who published a version of the same 
idea in a blog post in 2008 https ://panex perie ntial ism.blogs pot.com/2008/08/goldi locks -enigm a.html (the 
term ‘cosmopyschism’ was also coined on Gaudry’s blog).
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